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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1] enables two re-
mote users Alice and Bob to generate key, which is not
a classically possible task. QKD is not only a practically
important field but also a theoretically appealing one.
After security of QKD for ideal devices was shown [2, 3],
problems due to imperfect devices surfaced. Although
a problem due to imperfect source was resolved [4],
problem due to imperfect detectors still had remained.
Device-independent (DI) QKD’s elegantly overcome the
imperfect device problems [5]. However DI QKD is not
yet feasible. In this background measurement-device-
independent (MDI) QKD was proposed [6]. MDI QKD
is secure provided that source is ideal, that is, source
is exactly in the prescribed quantum states. The latest
protocols [7, 8] adapts a relaxed condition that source
should be within 2-dimensional subspace. In the proto-
cols, bit error rate can be directly measured. But phase
error rate is indirectly obtained by bounding difference
between phase and bit error rates. Here phase error rate
is more or less overestimated and thus key rate is reduced
compared with previous MDI QKD’s with characterized
sources.
In this paper, we propose an improved bound for the
difference between phase error rate and bit error rate.
The improved one reduces the overestimation and thus
gives larger key rates.
In section II, we briefly introduce the MDI QKD with
uncharacterized qubits. In section III, we provide im-
proved bound. In section VI, we discuss and conclude.
II. MDI QKD WITH UNCHARACTERIZED
QUBITS
For the protocol [8], each user prepares two encoding
states. Let the states prepared by Alice and Bob denoted
by |ϕm〉 and |ϕ′n〉, respectively, where m,n = 0, 1. Here
nothing is supposed about the encoding states so they are
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completely un-characterized. Each user also prepares a
checking state which is assumed to be a superposition of
the encoding states. Alice’s and Bob’s checking states
are, respectively,
|ϕ2〉 = c0|ϕ0〉+ c1eiθ|ϕ1〉,
|ϕ′2〉 = c′0|ϕ′0〉+ c′1eiθ
′ |ϕ′1〉. (1)
Here cm and c
′
n are non-negative numbers and θ and θ
′
are real. The protocol is as follows.
(1) Alice generates a random number i where i =
0, 1, 2. She sends a state |ϕi〉 to Charlie. Here Charlie can
be anyone. So Charlie can be either Eve (eavesdropper)
or users themselves. (2) Bob independently generates a
random number j where j = 0, 1, 2. He also sends a state
|ϕ′j〉 to Charlie. (3) Charlie performs a measurement on
the states |ϕi〉 and |ϕ′j〉. The measurement can be any
one which finally gives two outcomes 0 and 1. Charlie an-
nounces the outcome. (4) When the outcome is 0, users
discard the data. Otherwise, they keep the data. By
sacrificing some of the data for public discussion, users
estimate, p1ij , conditional probability to get outcome 1 for
each i, j. (5) Measurement data with both i and j less
than 2 become raw key. Other data with either i or j is 2
are used for checking purposes. Users do post-processing
to get final key.
Now let us consider Charlie’s measurement on the
states |ϕi〉 and |ϕ′j〉. In the most general collective at-
tack, Eve attaches an ancilla |e〉 to the states and then
applies a unitary operation to them [8]
UEve|ϕi〉|ϕ′j〉|e〉|0〉M =√
p0ij |Γ0ij〉|0〉M +
√
p1ij |Γ1ij〉|1〉M . (2)
Eve gets the outcome by measuring the quantum state
indexed by M in basis of |0〉 and |1〉. It is enough to
consider only the data with the measurement outcome 1
because those with 0 is discarded. For convenience, let
us omit 1 from now on, |Γ1ij〉 ≡ |Γij〉 and p1ij ≡ pij . Now
we can see that Eqs. (1) and (2) give constraints
√
p2n |Γ2n〉 = √p0n c0|Γ0n〉+√p1n c1eiθ|Γ1n〉, (3)√
pm2 |Γm2〉 = √pm1 c′0|Γm0〉+
√
pm1 c
′
1e
iθ′ |Γm1〉,(4)
√
p22 |Γ22〉 =
∑
m,n
√
pmn cmc
′
ne
iθmeiθ
′
n |Γmn〉, (5)
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2where θ0 = θ
′
0 = 0, θ1 = θ, and θ
′
1 = θ
′. Constraints
(3)-(5) play key roles in security analysis.
For theoretical purposes, we consider an equiva-
lent entanglement distillation protocol [3, 9]. In
the hypothetical protocol, Alice and Bob prepare en-
tangled states (1/
√
2)(|0〉A1 |ϕ0〉A2 + |1〉A1 |ϕ1〉A2) and
(1/
√
2)(|0〉B1 |ϕ′0〉B2 + |1〉B1 |ϕ′1〉B2), respectively. Alice
and Bob send quantum states indexed by A2 and B2 to
Charlie, respectively. According to Charlie’s announce-
ment about when measurement outcome is 1, the users
post-select their qubits indexed by A1 and B1, respec-
tively. The post-selected state is given by [8]
ρ =
1
p00 + p11 + p01 + p10
·∑
q
P[
√
p00γ
q
00|0〉A1 |0〉B1 +
√
p11γ
q
11|1〉A1 |1〉B1
+
√
p01γ
q
01|0〉A1 |1〉B1 +
√
p10γ
q
10|1〉A1 |0〉B1 ]. (6)
Here P[x] ≡ |x〉〈x|, |Γmn〉 ≡
∑
q γ
q
mn|q〉, where |q〉
are a set of orthonormal states. From normalization,∑
q |γqmn|2 = 1. We consider four Bell states |ϕ±α〉 =
(1/
√
2)(|00〉±ei(αA+αB)|11〉) and |ψ±α〉 = (1/√2)(|01〉±
ei(αA−αB)|10〉) which are obtained by rotating each qubit
by Pauli operator σz with amount αA and αB , respec-
tively. Final key rate is given by R = 1−H(eb)−H(ep),
where H(x) = −x log2 x − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) is binary
Shannon entropy and eb and ep are bit and phase error
rates, respectively. Bit error rate is given by
eb = 〈ψ+α|ρ|ψ+α〉+ 〈ψ−α|ρ|ψ−α〉
=
p01 + p10
p00 + p11 + p01 + p10
(7)
for arbitrary αA and αB . Phase error rate is given by
ep = 〈ϕ−α|ρ|ϕ−α〉+ 〈ψ−α|ρ|ψ−α〉
≤ eb +
∑
q |
√
p00γ
q
00 − ei(αA+αB)
√
p11γ
q
11|2
2(p00 + p11 + p01 + p10)
. (8)
On the other hand, using normalization condition of
the states in Eq. (1) and constraints (3)-(5), a term∑
q |
√
p00γ
q
00 + e
i(θ+θ′)√p11γq11|2 can be upperbounded.
The normalization condition gives
(c0 − c1)2 ≤ 1 ≤ (c0 + c1)2,
(c′0 − c′1)2 ≤ 1 ≤ (c′0 + c′1)2. (9)
Constraints (3) and (4) imply
(
√
p00c0 −√p10c1)2 ≤ p20 ≤ (√p00c0 +√p10c1)2,
(
√
p01c0 −√p11c1)2 ≤ p21 ≤ (√p01c0 +√p11c1)2,
(
√
p00c
′
0 −
√
p01c
′
1)
2 ≤ p02 ≤ (√p00c′0 +
√
p01c
′
1)
2,
(
√
p10c
′
0 −
√
p11c
′
1)
2 ≤ p12 ≤ (√p10c′0 +
√
p11c
′
1)
2, (10)
where
√
pmn’s are fixed and cm are variables.
Constraint (5) gives upperbound for
∑
q |
√
p00γ
q
00 +
ei(θ+θ
′)√p11γq11|2 [8],∑
q
|√p00γq00 + ei(θ+θ
′)√p11γq11|2 ≤ max
c,c′
f(c, c′) (11)
where
f(c, c′) = min
{ (
√
p22 +
√
p01c0c
′
1 +
√
p10c1c
′
0 +
√
p11|c0c′0 − c1c′1|)2
(c0c′0)2
,
(
√
p22 +
√
p01c0c
′
1 +
√
p10c1c
′
0 +
√
p00|c0c′0 − c1c′1|)2
(c1c′1)2
}.
(12)
Optimization in Inequality (11) with constraints (9),(10)
can be done numerically. According to our computer
calculations, when bit error rate is small enough such
that final key rate is nonnegligible, c0c
′
0 and c1c
′
1 don’t
become 0. Thus here we consider only the case when the
c′s are not zero.
The fact that the term
∑
q |
√
p00γ
q
00+e
i(θ+θ′)√p11γq11|2
has an upperbound means that ∆ ≡ ∑q |√p00γq00 −
ei(αA+αB)
√
p11γ
q
11|2 has the same upperbound when αA+
αB = θ + θ
′ + pi. Hence we can obtain upperbound for
phase error rate, which then, with bit error rate, gives
the final key rate.
III. IMPROVED BOUND FOR PHASE ERROR
RATE
Let us consider the quantity to be bounded. We get
∆ =
∑
q
|√p00γq00 − ei(αA+αB)
√
p11γ
q
11|2
= p00 + p11 − 2√p00√p11 < [ei(αA+αB)〈Γ00|Γ11〉],
(13)
where < [z] is real part of a complex number z. Con-
straint (5) can be rewritten as
√
p00 c0c
′
0|Γ00〉+
√
p11 c1c
′
1e
i(θ+θ′)|Γ11〉 =√
p22 |Γ22〉 − √p01 c0c′1eiθ
′ |Γ01〉 − √p10 c1c′0eiθ|Γ10〉,
(14)
from which we get
< [ei(θ+θ′)〈Γ00|Γ11〉] ≤
|√p22 +√p01c0c′1 +
√
p10c1c
′
0|2 − p00c20c′02 − p11c21c′12
2
√
p00
√
p11c0c′0c1c
′
1
(15)
by || |A〉 + |B〉|| ≤ || |A〉|| + || |B〉|| where |A〉, |B〉 are
arbitrary states and || |A〉|| is norm of |A〉.
3First we upperbound < [ei(θ+θ′)〈Γ00|Γ11〉] with con-
straints (3) and (4).
< [ei(θ+θ′)〈Γ00|Γ11〉] ≤ max
c,c′
{ |
√
p22 +
√
p01c0c
′
1 +
√
p10c1c
′
0|2 − p00c20c′02 − p11c21c′12
2
√
p00
√
p11c0c′0c1c
′
1
}.
(16)
Maximization in Inequality (16) can be done similarly
with the constraints (9),(10).
Consider a case when the upperbound is negative, that
is < [ei(θ+θ′)〈Γ00|Γ11〉] ≤ −|Ω|, then we can see that
|〈Γ00|Γ11〉| is lowerbounded by the absolute value of the
upperbound, |〈Γ00|Γ11〉| ≥ |Ω|. Now it is easy to see that
we can always choose αA + αB such that
∆ ≤ p00 + p11 − 2√p00√p11 |Ω|. (17)
Now we can get upperbound for phase error rate by In-
equalities (8) and (17), from which we can get final key
rate.
Let us compare the two upperbounds. First consider
a case when p00 = p11 = (1/2)(1 − eb), p10 = p01 =
(1/2)eb, p20 = p21 = p02 = p12 = 1/4, and p22 = (1/2)eb.
The set of probabilities can be obtained by choosing
that |ϕ0〉 = |0〉, |ϕ1〉 = |1〉, |ϕ′0〉 = |0〉, |ϕ′1〉 = |1〉,
|ϕ2〉 = (1/
√
2)(|0〉 + |1〉), |ϕ′2〉 = (1/
√
2)(|0〉 − |1〉), and
measurement element for outcome 1 is |ϕ+〉〈ϕ+|. (Here
we are not supposing that the measurements are done
on the states actually. We consider the states and mea-
surements in order to show that the set of probabili-
ties are physically realizable. In the MDI QKD with
uncharacterized qubits, security is shown regardless of
how the set was generated.) We suppose channel be-
tween Alice and Charlie is depolarized [9]. But we sup-
pose channel between Bob and Charlie is perfect because
the measurement unit is controlled by Bob. Here the
higher the depolarization probability is, the higher the
bit error rate is. The final key rate and the quantity
∆/[2(p00 + p11 + p01 + p10)] are shown in Fig-1 and Fig-
2. Bit error rate that MDI QKD with uncharacterized
qubit can tolerate is not that high as we can see in Fig-1.
By the new bound, the tolerable bit error rate and the
final key rate have been considerably improved.
Next let us consider the case [8] when four single-
photon detectors with dark counting rate of d = 10−5
are used in the measurement unit. Here η denotes to-
tal transmission rate of the channel from Alice (Bob) to
the measurement unit in the middle of channel and no
Eve’s attack is assumed. The same states used in the de-
polarization case are chosen. Now we have p00 = p11 =
η2(1−d)2/2+2η(1−η)d(1−d)2+2(1−η)2d2(1−d)2, p10 =
p01 = p22 = 2η(1− η)d(1− d)2 + 2(1− η)2d2(1− d)2, and
p20 = p21 = p02 = p12 = (p00 + p01)/2. The key rates
by the two bounds and the original protocol [6] are de-
scribed in Fig-3. Here the reason why the key rates do
not differ much is that the bit error rate is not large.
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FIG. 1: Final key rate (y axis) versus bit error rate (x axis)
for depolarization channel.
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FIG. 2: ∆/[2(p00+p11+p01+p10)](y axis) versus bit error rate
(x axis) for depolarization channel. ∆/[2(p00+p11+p01+p10)]
is bound for gap between phase and bit error rates.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Inequality in (17) implies that if p00 = p11 and
|〈Γ00|Γ11〉| = 1 then the ∆ = 0 or the phase er-
ror rate equals to bit error rate for a certain choice
of Bell states. This can be confirmed by observing
that the state |Ψ〉〈Ψ| = ρ in Eq. (6) becomes |Ψ〉 =√
p00(|00〉+eiA|11〉)|Γ00〉+√p01|01〉|Γ01〉+√p10|10〉|Γ10〉,
where eiA = 〈Γ00|Γ11〉.
To summarize, MDI QKD with uncharacterized qubit
has an advantage that the condition for security is weaker
than that of normal MDI QKD’s. However, disadvantage
is low tolerable bit error rate due to the overestimation
for the phase error rate. Here we proposed an improved
bound for phase error rate. By simulations we showed
the bound considerably improved final key rates.
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FIG. 3: Final key rate multiplied by p00 + p11 + p01 + p10
(y axis) versus total transmission loss by dB (x axis) for four
single-photon detectors with dark counting. In the original
protocol, ideal source is supposed and thus phase error rate
is equal to bit error rate.
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